Abstract-The process of communication jamming can be modeled as a two-person zero-sum noncooperative dynamic game played between a communicator (a transmitter-receiver pair) and a jammer. We consider a one-way time-slotted packet radio communication link in the presence of a jammer, where the data rate is fixed and 1) in each slot, the communicator and jammer choose their respective power levels in a random fashion from a zero and a positive value; 2) both players are subject to temporal energy constraints which account for protection of the communicating and jamming transmitters from overheating. The payoff function is the time average of the mean payoff per slot. The game is solved for certain ranges of the players' transmitter parameters. Structures of steady-state solutions to the game are also investigated. The general behavior of the players' strategies and payoff increment is found to depend on a parameter related to the payoff matrix, which we call the payoff parameter, and the transmitters' parameters. When the payoff parameter is lower than a threshold, the optimal steady-state strategies are mixed and the payoff increment constant over time, whereas when it is greater than the threshold, the strategies are pure, and the payoff increment exhibits oscillatory behavior.
Analysis of an On-Off Jamming Situation as a Dynamic Game of each contestant has a limitation on its power handling capability, which arises because transmitting at very high power levels over a period of time can cause overheating and consequent thermal breakdown of the equipment. Analysis of such a scenario therefore calls for embedding in the game a suitable model of the thermal limitations of the communicating and jamming transmitters. We consider the case in which selected communication and jamming strategies are exercised in synchronism over T welldefined time slots, indexed by integers 1, 2, ..., T. In the t/th slot (tf denotes the forward-time index) 1 the communicator transmits an information-bearing signal with a power level X tf , and the jammer transmits a jamming signal with a power level Y tf .lt is natural to infer the following. 1) At the beginning of any time slot, there is accumulation of thermal energy in the communicating and the jamming transmitters owing to past transmissions. 2) Over the current slot duration, a fraction of this energy is dissipated, while the remainder adds on to the energy generated by the current slot's transmission. 3) To avoid transmitter failure due to thermal breakdown, the accumulated thermal energy at the end of any slot should not exceed a threshold for either player. This justifies the need for temporal energy constraints.
To incorporate this kind of reasoning in a model, let Z t; represent the accumulated thermal energy in the communicating transmitter at the end of time slot tf, and assume that a fraction 8c of this energy has not been dissipated by the end of the following time slot. Assuming that there is no initial accumulated thermal energy, the evolution of the accumulated thermal energy process in the communicating transmitter can be modeled by
where 8c is the thermal memory constant of the communicating transmitter. The constraint for survivability of the communication transmitter to the end of slot tf is simply that = 0,...,t f -l; t f =
'We are using tj to denote the forward-time index to distinguish it from the reverse-time index t which will be used later.
where C max is the thermal breakdown threshold in the communicating transmitter. The jammer's accumulated thermal energy is assumed to be governed by a similar equation 
where J max is the thermal breakdown threshold in the jamming transmitter. The temporal energy constraints of the communicator and the jammer are thus given by (2) and (4), respectively. These constraints are the elements of our game model which account for the prevention of transmission failure due to thermal breakdown of the players' transmitters and make the game dynamic. Models with time-averaged power constraints or energy constraints, which, in our framework, can be interpreted as the nondissipative model with S c = Sj = 1, have been investigated in [4] [5] [6] . We assume that in our slotted time epoch of T slots, each slot may or may not contain a packet, depending on whether or not the communicator chooses to transmit a signal. Similarly, the same slot may or may not contain a jamming signal. If the communicator chooses to transmit in a given slot, a fixed level C (C > 0) of thermal energy will be released in the communication transmitter. Similarly, a jammer's transmission in a time slot will release a level J (J > 0) of energy in the jammer's transmitter. The levels C and J can be scaled to possess the unit of power. The payoff G(X tf , Y tf ) to the communicator, as a function of whether or not either of the players are transmitting in time slot tf, can be described by a simple 22 matrix
When the communicator does not attempt a transmission in slot tf, i.e., X tf = 0, the payoff for that slot is 0. At the opposite extreme, one unit of payoff is given to the communicator when it transmits and the jammer is off. When both players actively transmit in a time slot, the payoff a will fall between these two extremes. It is plausible that many payoff functions can be normalized in this fashion. We shall call a the payoff parameter.
A key assumption about the payoff function is that it is additive over a sequence of slotted transmissions. The overall payoff is the expected value of the average payoff per slot for activities over a sequence of T time slots. This can be modeled as
The communicator's payoff matrix is G. Since the game is zero-sum, the payoff to the jammer is -G(X t , Y t ,) and the jammer's payoff matrix is -G.
Certainly, a normalized throughput per packet, averaged over channel disturbances, can be viewed as one such additive payoff function G(X tf , Y tf ).
For noncooperative games between a communicator which is designed to communicate over a channel, and a hostile jammer which is designed to jam the communication system, there are a number of papers in the open literature which use different types of payoff functions, such as channel capacity [7] , signal-to-noise ratio [8] , error probability [9] , and mutual information [10] . Games with ensemble average power constraints were dealt with in [11]- [15] . In such work, static games were solved analytically, assuming independent play in each time slot. The use of ensemble averages for average-power-constraint modeling does not take into account the time-varying thermal behavior of the transmitters, and no parameter corresponding to a thermal memory constant exists in these analyses.
Dynamic game models were considered in [4] [5] [6] and [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . Antijamming codes were studied in [6] using a constrained game model with probability of correct decision as the payoff. The performance of the arbitrarily varying channel, which can be interpreted as a model of a channel jammed by an intelligent and unpredictable adversary, was studied in [4 ] , [5] , [16] [17] [18] , and [21] from an information theoretic point of view. Significant results on the coding capacities of additive channels were obtained in [22] [23] [24] . The influence of information in noncooperative games was investigated in [19] using methods of information theory. Maximin and minimax detection problems for signals having temporal power constraints with the payoff as the probability of error of the detector were formulated and solved in [20] .
Our work differs from those of the past in that the model is not directly related to channel capacity, but that it pertains to one motivated by simplified communication engineering practice [25] . We first solve a dynamic game over a finite number of slots by using dynamic programming, and then consider the behavior of the optimal strategies as the reverse-time index goes to infinity. The infinite horizon case is also considered. The general behavior of the players' strategies and payoff increment is found to depend on the payoff parameter a and the transmitters' parameters. When a is lower than a threshold, which is a function of the parameters, the optimal steady-state strategies are mixed and the payoff increment constant over time, whereas when it is greater than the threshold, the strategies are pure, and the payoff increment exhibits oscillatory behavior. This phenomenon is significant since it is the outcome of the temporal energy constraints which introduce dynamism in the game.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the dynamic jamming game model by expressing the payoff as a function of the strategies and setting up the evolution equation to solve for the optimal strategies using dynamic programming. Section III presents a 2 x 2 grid solution for both the finite horizon and the infinite horizon cases. In Section IV, we analyze the structure of coset-generated grid solutions for the game. Section V provides an example of how the game model can be applied to a communication system which employs binary phase-shift keying (BPSK). The conclusions are given in Section VI.
II. DYNAMIC GAME MODEL
In our model, the sequence {X tf }, X tf e {0, C} for all tf e {1, 2, ..., T}, of communicator power levels describes the sequence of communicator's decisions to transmit or not transmit. Similarly, the sequence {Y tf }, Y tf e {0, J} for tf, ofjammer power levels describes the sequence of jammer's decisions to jam or not.
The players are subject to the constraints (2) and (4) . Let the operating plane of the communicator (jammer) be the C max /C versus S c plane (J max ./J versus Sj plane). In order for the energy constraints to come into play, the operating regions of the communicator and the jammer must lie, respectively, within 1-Sj
The transmitter parameters C max , S c , -/max, Sj are assumed to be known to both players. We further assume that the payoff parameter a [see (5) ] is known to both sides. The value of a typically depends on factors not known to either transmitter, e.g., the signal-to-interference ratio in the communication receiver. Part of the objective of this analysis is to find out how the optimal strategies of the competitors depend on this parameter, as a first step toward approaches to the jamming game without precise knowledge of a.
The scenario for the game, along with the parameters, is shown in Fig. 1 .
A. Payoff as a Function of the Strategies
Let t = T -tf denote the reverse-time index. From (1) and (3), we find that Z T -t admits only those energies that belong to a set <& t defined as
and W T -t admits only those energies that belong to an analogous set tf t which can be expressed by replacing C by J, S c by T -*, for t = l,
hetp t (z, w) (q t (z, w)) denote the probability that the communicator (jammer) selects power level C () at reverse-time t (i. e., at the beginning of slot T -t), given that the communicator and jammer have retained z and w units of energy, respectively, from past transmissions. Then, these selection probabilities or strategies can be defined as
Pt(z, w) = Pr (X T _ t = C\Z T _ t _ x = z, W T -t-i = w) q t (z, w) = Pr (y T -t = J\Z T -t-i = z, W T -t-i =
where z e $ t +i, w e tf t +i, t = 0, ..., T -1. The payoff Q in (6) can be expressed in terms of a time-reversed sequence {S o , ..., S T -i} governed by the equations
The quantity S t is thus the backward accumulated payoff at the nontrivial elements of the strategy sets, and is therefore a cowbeginning of slot T -t given the past energy accumulations tinuous functional of these elements. Hence Zr-t-i and Wir-t-i • Equation (11) can be rewritten as 
.,QT-I). (16) since there is no initial accumulated energy. The constraints (2) and (4) 
The strategy sets V t for the communicator and Q t for the jammer at reverse-time t, t = 0, ..., T -1, are defined as
; w e where U(-) denotes the unit step function, and takes into account the conditions (13) . From (9) and (14), the cardinalities of the sets V t and Q t are given by
The minimax theorem [27] states that Vj, < Vu • A strategy set sequence {V o , ..., PT-I} satisfying (16) is called an optimal strategy set sequence for the communicator, while a sequence {Q o , ..., QT-I} satisfying (17) is an optimal strategy set sequence for the jammer. Our objective in solving the game is finding optimal strategy set sequences for the players.
The finite dimensional vector of at most (2(4 T -l))/3 elements [see (15) ] of the strategy sets
QT-I has some elements which are zeros [due to (13) ], and each of the other nontrivial elements belongs to the compact convex set [0, 1]. The payoff Q is a continuous functional of these nontrivial elements. Therefore, there exists a sequence {PQ, ..., V^_ 1 } and a sequence {QQ, ..., Q T -i} such that [27] T-i ( 1 8 ) Therefore, the finite horizon game admits a saddle-point, and it Equation (19b) is a reverse-time recursion in terms of is given by strategy sets S* (z, w 
• • • J Q-T-I)
are optimal strategy set sequences for the communicator and jammer, respectively. The value of the game is the quantity Q{VQ, ..., V^_^, Q* o , ..., Q^-i)-
.
The Evolution Equation
For the finite horizon game, a set of optimal strategies can be obtained by applying dynamic programming [28] on the accumulated payoff in (12) . From (12) and (13), we obtain the evolution equation, as shown in (19) at the bottom of the page, for t = 0, ..., T -2, where value () denotes the value of the zero-sum game with payoff matrix H, and S* (z, w) is the optimum accumulated payoff at reverse-time t given the past energy accumulations z and w. The value of the game is given by S*{8 c z, Note that in (21), when (C max -C)/<5 C < z < C max , 0 < w < (J miK -J)/Sj, the communicator cannot transmit owing to the constraints, implying p* 0 (z, w) = 0. The jammer, although having the option of transmitting with any nonzero probability and still maintaining SQ(Z, W) = 0, chooses to remain idle because it has no signal to jam. Therefore, q^z, w) = 0. It can be shown from constraints (2) and (4) 
Therefore, the only unknown optimal strategies are p$ (z, w) and qt(z, w), when 0 < z < (C max -C)/8 C , 0 < w < (Jmax -J)/8j, t = 1, ..., T -1. A roadmap of the computation of optimal strategies is shown in Fig. 2 .
III. A 2x 2 GRID SOLUTION UNDER CERTAIN OPERATING CONDITIONS
In the evolution equation (19) , the communicator's past energy accumulation z at reverse-time t + 1 has two images at t is satisfied, then we have
and the interval mapping for z from t + ltot becomes
The condition (25) for the communicator can be rewritten as
(27) -o^.
G From (21) and (22), we have This specifies the operating condition of the communicator for the optimum accumulated payoff to have two intervals
, ((C max -C)/fc, C max ] or simply owe critical point (C max -C)/8 C on the z-axis for all t. We shall call (27) the communicator's one-critical-point region. It is indicated in Fig. 8 , region "1." It corresponds to the condition that the communicator may pick any sequence of "transmit/no transmit" choices which does not include two consecutive transmits. In addition to (27) , when the jammer's parameters also satisfy the analogous condition Substituting the payoff function of (29) in (19b), and using (22), we obtain the following system of equations [29] :
The reverse-time initial conditions are given by (30) .
A. Solution to the Finite Horizon Problem
When the duration of play or horizon length T is finite, the evolution equation (32) can be solved to obtain the optimal strategies p\ x , q\ x for t = 1, ..., T -1. From (20) , the value of the game is Q* = (l/T)^"
1 . We will formulate the evolution equation in terms of the payoff increments to obtain the solution.
The increment of the optimum payoff Sjj, i, j £ {1, 2}, in going from t to t + 1, is bounded and lies in [0, 1], since each element of the payoff matrix G [see (5) 
and the condition 0 < A^ < 1 holds. Substituting S**^1 = Sjj + \\j in (32) and eliminating S{ 1: S{ 2 , and Sl 2 , (32a) simplifies to for £ = 0, ..., T -1. We shall call a solution corresponding to (29) a 2 x 2 grid solution, the operating conditions for which are given by (27) and (28) . and it is clear that q^3 = 1. However, any p*^3 e [0, 1] will give the value a -A*^1. In our scenario, the communicator would rather transmit with probability 1, and therefore we choose P5.| 3 = 1. To investigate the behavior of the optimal strategies p\ x and q\ x as t -> oo, we analyze difference equation (34) . The following proposition establishes the behavior of A* x for t -> oo.
Proposition 1: When t -> oo, the solution A* x of the difference equation (34) converges to A = if 0 < a < -oscillates between (1 -a) and (2a -1) with a period of2if -< a < 1
for all initial conditions A°x, A} x e 71. The proposition can be proved by first finding the local Lyapunov exponents of (34) , and then applying the multiplicative ergodic theorem of Oseledec to obtain the global Lyapunov exponents [30] . The proof is given in [31] . Fig. 4 . For 0 < a < 2/3, the strategies are mixed, and for 2/3 < a < 1, the strategies are pure. In the mixed strategy zone, bothpn and gu increase with increase in a, but pn < gu.
When t -> oo, the payoff increment profile (profile of A*-) on the (z, w) plane is a constant A for 0 < a < 2/3, but oscillates between two patterns as shown in Fig. 5 (a) and (b) for 2/3 < a < 1.
B. The Infinite Horizon Game
We treat the infinite horizon problem as the limit of the finite horizon case with horizon length T as T -> oo, provided the payoff Q remains bounded and the optimal strategy sequences We find from (5) that the payoff Q in (6) Since it has already been found from Proposition 1 and (36) that the optimal strategy sequences {j)' n } and {qn} converge to well-defined limits pn and qn, respectively, when the reverse-time index t -> oo, we have, for every finite tf It is also clear that strategies pn and qn constitute the stationary solution of the evolution equation (32) , that is, they are the optimal stationary strategies of the game as T -> oo. The value of the game for the infinite horizon case is therefore given by [see (12c), (20) , and (38)]
A plot of Q^ versus a is shown in Fig. 6 . In the figure, the region 0 < a < 2/3 corresponds to the constant payoff increment profile, while the region 2/3 < a < 1 corresponds to the oscillatory profile as stated in Proposition 1. As result, when a e (0, 2/3], the value of the game is simply the payoff increment A = ((5 -a) -y/(9 -o)(l -«))/8. On the other hand, when a e (2/3, 1), since the period of oscillation is 2, the value is (A* n + Ait 1 )^ = ((1 -a) + (2a -l) )/2 = a/2. 
IV. COSET-GENERATED M X N GRID SOLUTIONS
In the 2 x 2 grid solution considered so far, the optimum accumulated payoff S^(z,w) has one critical point (C max -C)/8c on the z-axis, and another critical point (J max -J)/Sj on the u;-axis for all t. From the evolution equation (19), we find that in general S* (z, w) has a grid structure on the (z, w) plane for all t, the boundaries of the grids being determined by critical points. Thus, SQ (Z, W) has one critical point on either axis, and, as t increases, the number of critical points on the respective axes may or may not increase depending on the operating points (Sc, Cmax/C'), (Sj, J m ax./J)-Define an operator Z which maps the communicator's past energy accumulation z at reverse-time t to that at t + 1 as
An analogous operator W which maps the j ammer' s past energy accumulation w at t to that att+lcanbe expressed by replacing C by J, S c by 6j, C max by J max , z by w in (41). Let U c (t) denote the communicator's critical point set at reverse-time t, and Uj{t) the jammer's. Then 
-C I-6 C ' J 1-6/ The backward recursions that describe the communicator's and jammer's critical point set computations are given by
for t = 0, 1, 2,... . Therefore, at every reverse-time step, the number of critical points on the z-axis or w-axis can at most double. If we have the condition
_ ^maxj
UciO) -C 6c
which is the same as (27) , thenU c {t) = {(C max -C)/6 C } for all t. Similarly, the condition
guarantees that Uj{i) = {(J max -J)/6j} for all t. Conditions (45) and (46) specify the operating conditions for a 2 x 2 grid solution, which have already been found earlier [see (27) and (28)]. We are interested in finding operating conditions for which there are at most M-\ critical points of S* t (z, w) on the z-axis and N -1 critical points on the u;-axis for all t, that is, S* (z, w) has an M x N grid structure. Say, for some reverse-time r\, S*(z, w) has critical points ai,..., a M -i (ai < 
., a M -i}
where a^ is given by (47), and this results in the critical point generation system [32] ( 
Comparing (51) and (52), we find that the following isomorphisms hold for each generation index vector [ci, ..., c M -i]:
Thus, we conclude that the number of coset-generated relevant solutions of the critical point generation system for any natural number M > 2 equals the number h(M) of full cyclotomic cosets mod (2 M -1) given by [33] = jj E d|M where /u is the Mob ius function of number theory. The communicator's coset-generated (M -l)-critical-point region for which ai, ..., <IM-I are the coset-generated critical points of 5* t *(z, to) on the z-axis for all t is given by (50). The,jammer's coset-generated (N -l)-critical-pointregion for which bi, ..., b^-i are the coset-generated critical points on the u;-axis for all t can be found in an analogous way.
For M = 2, 3, 4, the possible sets of M -1 coset-generated critical points ai, ..., OM-I and each of the h(M) coset-generated (M -1) -critical-point regions are shown in Fig. 7 . Fig. 8 shows a plot of these coset-generated critical-point regions on the (8c, C max /C) plane (operating plane of communicator). Thus, the number of one-critical-point regions is h(2) = 1, the number of two-critical-point regions is h(3) = 2, and the number of three-critical-point regions is /i(4) = 3. All these regions are disjoint, are bounded by the curves C maii /C = 1/(1 -Sc), C max /C = l/Sc, C nia^/ C = 1, and lie within (is[, ..., v' N ) . The procedure for formulation of the evolution equation using coset generation index vectors has been presented in [34] . A general way of expressing analytically the behavior of optimal strategies as t -> oo has not yet been found.
There exist other kinds of M x TV grid solutions in which one or both of the players' critical points are not generated by cosets. For example, if we choose Cmax/C = (1 + 6% -6%)/{I -6%) and 6c is not too large, then there are three critical points
on the z-axis. As an illustration, consider 8 C = 2/3, C max ,/C = 31/19. The critical points ai, a 2 , a 3 onthez-axis are generated as 12 18 -We will not consider such investigations here.
V. AN EXAMPLE OF BPSK SIGNALING
Consider a situation in which the transmitter communicates with a coherent receiver over an AWGN channel by employing BPSK signaling with carrier frequency f c . The jammer tries to jam the receiver's signal by injecting additional noise into the receiver. When symbol i (i = 0, 1) is transmitted, the received signal over the t/th symbol interval (time slot) of duration T s is given by r(-r) = ^2X tf COS(2TT/ C T + wr) +
(t f -1)T S <T< t f T a ;
(55)
where X tf is the communicating signal power, n(r) the additive channel noise, and nj(r) the additive jamming noise. The noises n(r) and UJ{T) are assumed to be independent zero-mean white Gaussian random processes with two-sided power spectral densities (PSD's) N o /2 and Y tf /(2B), respectively, Y tf being the jamming signal power and B the channel bandwidth.
Since the PSD of the total noise n(r) + 
Since C cap (0, 0) = C cap (0, J) = 0, we can define the payoff to the communicator as
which is nondecreasing with an increase in X tf and a decrease in Y tf , and satisfies the conditions 
corresponding to the payoff matrix G in (5) .
To compare a randomized power game situation with a fixed power scheme, consider the following two cases. 1) The communicator and jammer randomize their power levels over {0, C} and {0, J}, respectively, and the conditions (27) and (28) for a 2 x 2 grid solution hold. 2) The communicator and jammer use fixed power levels C and J, respectively, satisfying C < C max (l -S c ) and J < J max (l -6j) owing to the temporal energy constraints. 
while in case 2) we assume that each player transmits at the maximum allowable power level to prevent the opponent from taking any advantage, implying C = C max (l -6 C ), J = Jmax(l " Sj).
When the communicator and jammer operate over a long period of time (, the number of time slots, is large), the optimum payoff in case 1) is the value Q^ of the infinite horizon game given by (40) with a as in (59), while in case 2), the payoff is simplyG(C, J),whereG(. ; .)isgivenby(58). WithS = 1/T S , plots of the payoffs for the randomized strategy case 1) and the fixed strategy case 2) versus the signal-to-white-noise-ratio CT S /N O are shown in Fig. 9 . The plots reveal that when the communicator's transmitter is more powerful than the j ammer's [characterized by C max > J max , <?>c < SJ as in Fig. 9(a) ], the payoff is higher for the fixed strategy case. However, when the j ammer's transmitter is more powerful than the communicator's [characterized by C max < J max , S c > Sj as in Fig. 9(b) ], the randomized strategy case gives a higher payoff. Therefore, a communicator with a powerful transmitter is better off by transmitting at a fixed power level, since this compels the weak jammer to do the same. On the other hand, when the jammer's transmitter is strong and the communicator's is weak, the communicator should use a randomized transmission scheme; this also forces the jammer to randomize its transmission.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The main finding is that under certain operating conditions, the dynamic jamming game which we have considered admits steady-state optimal strategies that are mixed when a is lower than a threshold, but pure when it is higher. The mixed strategies give rise to a constant payoff increment profile on the energy accumulation plane [(z, w) plane], while the pure strategies result in an oscillatory profile, except for the fact that at the threshold the strategies are pure but the payoff increment profile is a constant. We have also shown how some grid solutions can be obtained from cyclotomic cosets. An example of a typical communication scenario comparing the use of randomized strategies with that of fixed ones is also presented.
The oscillatory behavior of the payoff increment and the role of the threshold for its appearance are very interesting for both the practical communication jamming problem as well as the game-theoretic problem perse. In infinite time games, people usually consider stationary nonoscillatory behavior, whereas our study indicates that oscillatory ones should be a legitimate object of study. Actually, other game applications, such as battle of species models, lead to similar oscillatory behaviors as time increases.
It is also to be noted that two assumptions in the model we have considered are: 1) both players have precise knowledge of the payoff parameter a and the transmitters' parameters; 2) each player obtains correct feedback information about the other's past actions. A situation in which the knowledge of a and the transmitters' parameters is not precise and the feedback information is not always correct calls for an adaptive game model, and is an interesting and relevant topic for further research.
